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Abstract:
Seeking to determine the factors driving political cultures onto distinct trajectories, researchers 
have considered development one of the main causes for emerging new values, which configure 
political culture trends along with cultural heritage as a conservative force. We argue that if 
the theories are correct, then they should function not only at the national level but also at 
other levels. We found that disparate human development levels in Iranian provinces, as a 
result of the concentration of resources and wealth in some regions, are contributing to the 
diverse levels of emerging democratic values and attitudes across the country and among 
provinces, which in turn has driven the country to a cultural heterogeneity in terms of these 
new values. Furthermore, the inconsistent case of Kurds indicates that there is still room 
for the cultural heritages of small worlds to impose their forces on national political culture 
structure. 
Keywords: democratic values, Iranian development plans, heterogeneous political culture, 
small world, Kurds.
Introduction
The Iranian modern era has experienced two political revolutions (Constitutional Revolution of 
1906–1911 and Islamic Revolution of 1979) and many pro-democratic movements (e.g., Nationalist 
movement 1951-1953, reformism movement of 1997, and Green movement of 2009-2010), heralding 
more freedom and liberation from authoritarianism. Despite these pro-democratic attempts with 
strong mass support, all of them eventually failed, and this country is still categorised as a non-
democratic society.1
Despite numerous mass demands and popular uprisings in both revolutionary and reformist shapes, 
the failure in democratisation and the recurrence of authoritarianism raise questions about the 
underpinning mechanisms involved in the iteration and maintenance of this circle in countries 
like Iran. How and why cannot mass demands for democracy change the playground in favour of 
democracy and what dynamics underlie these developments? 
There is a great body of literature explaining the democratisation process in Iran from different 
aspects, most of which discusses the incompatibility of Islam and democracy (for a general review 
of Iranian intellectuals’ viewpoints on this subject, see Mirsepassi (2010); some others have adopted 
structural and institutional viewpoints (for recent works see Azimi, 2009 and Parsa, 2016), and 
few have highlighted the Iranian socio-cultural habits and behaviours (e.g., see Katouzian 2003; 
2004; Pirzadeh, 2019). Employing political culture approaches, this study is another attempt to 
explore this issue to highlight fundamental, but often neglected, factors that underlie the paths to 
democratisation.
Political culture has been considered as a phenomenon establishing the political stability and 
legitimacy of regimes (Almond & Verba, 1963; Eckstein, 1966; Ruck et al., 2020), influencing citizens' 
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political behaviour and orientations (Flanagan & Lee, 2003), and also, driving changes in regimes’ 
institutions (Welzel, 2020). In this way, the Democratic Political Culture (DPC) is considered as a 
prerequisite condition toward democratisation (Inglehar & Welzel, 2005) and, in turn, socio-economic 
development is responsible for its emergence and prevalence in every society (Welzel, 2014). On 
the other hand, other researchers highlight the effect of cultural heritage, which can strengthen 
or resist the newly emerged values and attitudes at the macro-scale of civilization (Huntington, 
1996; Inglehart et al., 2003) and small worlds within nation-states (Henderson, 2004; Hepburn, 2010). 
Therefore, the democratic political culture that is responsible for the democratisation procedure 
originates from the driving forces of development and tradition or their combination. 
In this study, this knowledge has been utilised to assess those factors that may exert influence on 
DPC, which, in turn, are involved in deviating the democratisation process of contemporary Iran. 
But we would argue that studies of political culture, relying on aggregate national mean scores 
to appraise the wholeness of the country and using nation-states as the unit of analysis, regularly 
ignore or underestimate the cultural dynamics and heterogeneities of societies. As the experience 
of Iran (and possibly many other developing countries) shows, strong economic gaps and unequal 
development across the country accumulated over the course of more than one hundred years cannot 
simply be covered by and reduced to national mean scores of GDP or HDI. Thus, since the cross-
national variations of development that result in disparity in DPC and, similarly, biased development 
planning or inequality are likely to cause variation in DPC within a country. Furthermore, many 
nations including Iran comprise more than one ethnic group which each can function as small 
worlds in the national cultural context. These communities may contain strong cultural heritage 
that allows them to resist and curb or stimulate and strengthen every emerging value and attitude. 
That is, they may have the capability of causing bias in national trends of political cultures. As the 
principal aim of this article, we analyse these issues to explore the deeper layer of political culture 
developments and to create a more realistic image of the country in terms of political culture. In this 
way, a cross-sectional study has been conducted to examine the impact of provincial development 
and the potential of ethno-religious communities on variation in political culture across the country. 
More precisely, the following questions are addressed: Does the HDI and its components in Iranian 
provinces influence their DPC? Does ethnic cultural heritage really matter? Do different Iranian 
ethnic groups report a significantly different DPC?
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. In a first step, we review the modern history of 
Iran, emphasising the centralisation process and its consequences on Iranian economic development. 
Next, the relevant literature of political culture as the prerequisite condition toward democracy is 
reviewed and then, hypotheses are formulated. In the subsequent section, using data from the fifth 
World Values Survey (2005-2009), the measures and variables to test the hypotheses are described. 
Finally, we present our findings and conclusions, along with their implications.
State building, rentier system and persistent regional inequality in multi-ethnic 
Iran
Iran is a predominantly Muslim country with a majority of Shiite (90%) and a minority of Sunni 
Muslims (10%) mainly residing in the border provinces of Sistan and Balouchistan, Kurdistan, 
Kermanshah, West Azerbaijan, and Golestan. There are also some minority religious groups such 
as Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, and Bahais, which approximately comprise 2% of the total 
population according to some sources (Sanasarian, 2000, p. 9). Furthermore, Iran is a multi-ethnic 
country including Persians (61%), Azeris and Turkmens (18%), Kurds (10%), Lurs (6%) and other 
ethnicities (5%) with small population numbers.2 
2    http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/iran/
Although there are no formal statistics on the number of different ethnic and religion groups, since the locations of ethnic 
groups across the Iran map are historically well known, researchers make their calculations based on the population of cities 
and provinces. Below are two other databases which have provided these types of data: 
http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/index.shtml
https://chronicle.fanack.com/iran/population/#Minorities  
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Before and during the Turkish (Azeri) Qajar (1796-1925) Dynasty, Iran was a decentralised government 
under which the various territories called “Emarat” were enjoying almost independent political and 
economic authority in their regions. In return for annual tribute payments, these regional authorities 
were formally recognised by the King, and traditionally a balance of power had been established and 
institutionalised between the local rulers and the King (Amirahmadi, 1986).  
In 1925, the Qajar dynasty was abolished, and the Pahlavi era began. The first Pahlavi king, Reza 
Shah, adopted completely different policies inconsistent with Iranian history to westernise and 
modernise the society. During his reign, the political and power structure effectively transformed 
into a centralised one (Amanat, 2017, pp. 424-431). Overthrowing the semi-independent Emarats, he 
broke down the borders of regions and designed smaller new sub-state administrative units called 
Ostan (province) in the new bureaucratic system (Amirahmadi, 1986). Furthermore, new provincial 
governors were appointed directly by the Shah, and decision-making systems and political power 
were completely transferred to Tehran (Abrahamian, 2008, p. 71). The system is still in place, although 
the governor is appointed by the executive power. Therefore, the economic surplus was transferred 
in favour of the centre without the bargaining power of former regional powers (Amirahmadi, 
1986). Furthermore, he established a modern army, developed a national ideology based on Persian 
language and archaism, banned local clothes and traditions, and even replaced the names of local 
areas with fake Persian ones to reinforce the Persian identity and unify the country culturally and 
politically (Abrahamian, 2008, pp. 77-87; Amirahmadi, 1986; Keddie, 1988).
Under the reign of the second Pahlavi - Mohammad Reza Shah (1941-1979) - although there was some 
alleviation of pressures on local customs, all centralising policies continued intensely and ethnic 
political demands were met with bloody repression (Abrahamian, 2008, p. 112).  
Thanks to abundant and increasing oil revenues, during this period the state achieved indisputable 
dominance in the power structure and the king ruled over the nation independent of any local 
powers and social classes; furthermore, the rentier revenues motivated ambitious modernisation 
and development plans (Skocpol, 1982). In 1963, the king launched a major socio-economic project 
called the "White Revolution" with the main objective of transferring ownership of agricultural lands 
from major landowners to peasants. Under this program, landowners had to relinquish their land 
and in return receive state-owned industrial shares. In addition to leaving the left-hand opponents 
empty-handed and increasing his popularity, Shah succeeded in eliminating the last local power 
bases in favour of a centralised bureaucracy. With this, hundreds of thousands of peasants were 
directly connected to the state bureaucracy and government authority extended even to the most 
remote villages (Gelvin, 2011, pp. 252-253). Nevertheless, the oil revenues encumbered the regime 
with the common problem of bias in distributing its windfall revenues. The rentier governments 
tend to allocate their resources in line with familial, racial, ethnic, and religious affiliations to 
establish and maintain a patronage system (Schwarz, 2008). Since the ethnic regions in Iran are 
located in non-central areas, the bias in the distribution led to a territorial aspect; such that the 
predominantly Persian and Shiite centre of Iran benefited much more of the oil revenues and state 
investment compared to the ethnic areas. Aghajanian (1983) illustrated the institutionalisation of 
these inequalities by a complicated index of occupational structure, the rate of urbanisation, access 
to energy, health, and educational facilities, and also the level of poverty. For instance, in 1976, while 
the percentage of agricultural sector workers in the central regions (Persian provinces) was 13.8 
and the rate of urbanisation was 79.6 percent, the corresponding figures for Balouchistan, a non-
Persian Sunni province in the south-east of the country, were 57.1 percent and 24.5 percent and for 
Kurdistan, a Sunni-Kurdish province, were 51.6 percent and 24.2 percent. Moreover, 80.7 percent had 
access to electricity in central areas compared to 12.4 and 19.5 percent in Baluchistan and Kurdistan, 
respectively (Aghajanian, 1983). 
In post-revolutionary Iran (1979), the integration of the Twelver Shiite ideology into the former 
political structure, religious minorities, and non-Shiite areas came under increasing pressure, and 
most hopes were quickly crushed by the onset of hostility and the commencement of the invasion 
of ethnic groups who had demanded autonomy for their regions by the newly established central 
government. 
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Figure 1: Ethnic and religious geography of Iran and provincial per capita GDP
Source: The cartographic is based on the simplification of the ethnic and religion infographs (Izady, 
2016; 2018). The size of the circles represents the provincial GDP statistics, for which data has been 
retrieved from the Statistical Center of Iran: https://www.amar.org.ir/
Figure 2 demonstrates that the further the provinces get from the ideological bases of the 
government ethnically and religiously, the less possible it is for them to enjoy a fair portion of 
the GDP without oil. Except for East Azerbaijan, a Shiite-Turkish province, and Gilan, a Shiite-
Gilak province, the rest of the 16 top provinces are mainly Shiite-Persian. The Turkish-Shiite 
provinces occupy the middle of the figure. As observed, Sistan and Balouchistan, a mainly Sunni-
Balouch province, is placed at the end of the figure. Kurds (Kurdistan, Ilam, West Azerbaijan, and 
Kermanshah) and Lurs (Kohgiluyeh, Luristan, and Chaharmahal) constitute the other provinces 
that are placed at the right end of the figure. 
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Figure 2: Iranian provinces, GDP per capita without oil, 2007 (thousands rials)
Source: Statistical Center of Iran (in Persian), https://www.amar.org.ir/
In general, the formation of a modern state with Persian domination and Shiite ideology post-
revolution, as well as political centralism, weakness of democratic mechanisms, and finally, the 
concentration of industries and other revenue sources in the central Persian-Shiite regions have 
caused persistent inequality and an economic gap among various regions and provinces with 
different ethnic and religious backgrounds. 
In the next section, theories concerning the effects of economic gaps and ethnic diversity in 
directing political culture are discussed.
Literature review
What influences the trajectories of political culture in nonhomogeneous societies?
There has been ongoing debate about political culture diversity, its origins, and its impact on 
political systems in academic and policy circles. The concept was first introduced following World 
War II and originated from curiosity about differences among political systems around the world, 
especially the gap between the free world and the rest (Gendzel, 1997). Trying to distinguish the 
term from temporary political views, public opinions, and even political ideologies, scholars 
emphasise deep beliefs and attitudes toward policy and government. Almond (1956) defined 
political culture as "a particular pattern of orientations to political action" and Pye (1968) referred 
to it as "the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political 
process" (1968, p. 218). Political culture is a key aspect of a nation’s collective mentality that 
structures people’s political orientations and behaviour (Elazar, 1994). Therefore, political culture 
refers to ingrained ideas, beliefs, values, and orientations toward the policy, political phenomena, 
and decision-making processes. These orientations can determine the legitimate type of political 
system and leave profound effects on the nation's political trends. 
Almond and Verba (1963) were the first to theorise the concept and discern a relationship between 
political cultures and political structures. As they posit, political cultures can be classified into three 
ideal types of parochial, subject, and participant, which respectively are congruent orientations 
in the traditional, centralised authoritarian, and democratic political systems. In general, every 
regime's stability depends on compliance between their authority patterns and orientations of 
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ordinary people toward political objects (1963, pp. 24-26); particularly, democracies need “civic 
culture" as an appropriate combination of participant and subject orientations to flourish. In this 
view, the supply and consolidation of democracy in authoritarian regimes have been attributed 
to the cultural change toward democracy, especially emerging values and attitudes associating 
with democracy. Conversely, the supply of democracy without cultural preparedness would lead 
to inefficiency and institutional failure. Subsequent scholars went further and tried to track the 
origins of these political values. Some researchers have highlighted the role of institutions in 
the process of socialisation. In this way, democratic institutions are considered to be responsible 
for the instruction and dissemination of democratic values and attitudes in society (Jackman & 
Miller, 1998; Muller & Seligson, 1994; Rustow, 1970). Many others emphasise the potential specific 
characteristics of religions and cultures, which have consistency with attitudes toward democracy 
or, conversely, allow societies to be immune from new values; i.g., the positive effect of Christianity 
and negative impact of Islam and Confucianism (Huntington, 1996, pp. 300-310), Protestantism 
versus Islam and Catholicism (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, pp. 61-65; Lipset, 1994),  and the influence 
of British colonial heritage (Clague et al., 2001; Lee & Paine, 2019).
Here, we focus on two main schools (modernisation theory and the small world approach) that 
introduce factors and mechanisms which are responsible for value and attitude variations or 
transformations. They provide insights into the various trajectories of the political culture that 
societies take. Although, they emphasise different factors and existential conditions engaging in 
creating variation inter and intra-country, but are useful to identify the main cultural gaps and 
dynamics within societies, especially ethnically and economically divided ones such as Iran.
DPC and modernisation theory
Initially, from a predominantly structural viewpoint Lipset (1959) drew a relationship between 
democracy and economic development. According to him, the democratisation process and 
consolidation of democracy are more likely in developed countries. He defined economic 
development as wealth, industrialisation, urbanisation, and education. 
Confirming this relationship, subsequent studies of modernisation theory introduced more 
mechanisms like the expansion of the middle class, reducing class conflict, and more access to 
education and media, through which socio-economic development exerts its force on democracy 
(Diamond, 1993a; Lipset et al., 1993) and also highlighted human development parameters as a 
measure of wellbeing rather than economic growth (Diamond, 1992). Furthermore, modernisation 
theory has shown that cultural change in societies exposed to socio-economic development is 
inevitable (Dalton, 2013; Diamond, 1999, p. 18; Lerner, 1958). Subsequent researchers have focussed 
on these new emerging democratic values and attitudes as the factor directing societies toward 
democratisation.
Ronald Inglehart and his colleagues (2000; 2002; 2003; 2005; 2009; 2010), employing longitudinal 
data throughout the world, proposed an altered thesis of the modernisation theory called human 
development and emphasised the significance of civil values on the transition toward democracy. 
He argues that values relevant to democracy emerge under the influence of the emancipating forces 
of development. Human development theory suggests that increasing socioeconomic resources 
reduce individuals’ restrictions, advance their autonomy financially and communicationally, 
increase individuals' access to information and education, and promote their existential security. 
This process, in turn, drives them to self-expression values "that emphasize human emancipation, 
giving liberty priority over discipline, diversity over conformity and autonomy over authority" 
(Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, pp. 151-152). This cultural shift makes it critical for people to pursue 
their political and civil rights, and also puts pressure on institutions to recognise private and 
public liberties. Ultimately, these new ethos and values encourage people to organise and initiate 
collective actions, putting authoritarian regimes under pressure and pushing society toward a 
democratic one. In a recent attempt, Welzel (2013; 2014) proposes the theory of emancipation, 
reaffirming the significance of values and attitudes originated from modernisation for a democratic 
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transition. He describes modernisation as the process of empowerment, through which the lives 
of ordinary people are improved and their choices expanded. In other words, modernisation 
provides people with more action resources including intellectual resources (knowledge, skills, 
and information), connective resources (networks of exchange and contact interfaces), and 
material resources (equipment, tools, and income). In his view, the capability of people to exercise 
their freedoms is a direct reflection of their available resources, and so people with more resources 
enjoy more freedom; in the sense that they are freer to pursue what is valuable to them (2013, p. 
46). So, the causal pattern he draws is as follows: development provides more action resources, 
then enjoying resources of action gives rise to emancipative values. Alternatively, resources of 
action and emancipative values give rise to citizenship rights (2013, pp. 167-168). He insists that the 
converse path which institutionalist defend, that is, citizenship rights affect either development or 
emancipative values, is not plausible (2019). In this way, it is emancipative values that become the 
resource of collective actions, which shape more liberation-oriented social movements. The more 
people carry these values in society, the more people connect to each other, and the more social 
movements arise. Hence, these values have more to do with social movements than civil rights 
and even mere resources of action (pp. 240-246).
Totally, modernisation theory considers the DPC an intervening factor originated by development, 
which in turn motivates demands for democracy. Providing substantial evidence confirming the 
relationship between development and DPC, this approach has played a great role in explaining 
the democratisation process from a cultural viewpoint. 
Although the modernisation theories enjoy strong empirical supports and the mechanisms 
they introduce are plausible, almost all results have been obtained from national level statistics 
and cross-national comparison studies, so complexities and dynamics within countries are not 
considered. One problem with such studies is that they ignore demographic, political, cultural, 
and economic diversities within societies that cannot be simply covered by national-level averages. 
This approach holds a non-mentioned premise that economic development is an inclusive process 
that diffuses throughout the country and covers all the nation-state equally. Put differently, most 
research, focusing on the national level, associates the level of economic development (e.g., 
GDP) to the political culture mean scores. This is especially problematic in some developing 
and non-democratic regimes like Iran that have experienced uneven regional development and 
core-periphery systems. Snyder (2001) illustrates how national-level mean data can be illusory, 
concealing gaps and differentiations across a country, and leading to “Mean-Spirited analysis”, 
which “inappropriately employs highly aggregated data to code cases”. Combining and averaging 
all of these potential differences attenuates the reliability of mean numbers to represent societies 
in terms of both development and political culture. 
On the other hand, the strong logic of emancipation through access to more action resources 
can be applied at other levels (Welzel, 2013, p. 95). This relationship is close to what Sayer (1992) 
calls necessary relation, that is, “the particular ways-of-acting or mechanisms exist necessarily 
in virtue of their object’s nature. Nature or constitution of an object and its causal powers are 
internally or necessarily related” (p. 105). In other words, according to the causal relationship 
that modernisation theory considers, development can and should unavoidably influence values 
and attitudes at every level, so the diverse levels of development should bring about different 
value changes. Therefore, if part of the differences in emerged democratic values around the 
world is the result of the differentiation in the countries’ level of socio-economic development, 
then constant and stable intra-country differences in development levels, like what Iran has 
experienced, should lead to value divergence and cultural heterogeneity within countries. In this 
way, natural characteristics, diverse views of sovereignty, written and unwritten racial, religious 
laws, and political and economic policies may result in different developmental consequences for 
regions within countries; and thus, it may have implications on the nation-states' political culture 
structure.
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Cultural heritages of small worlds
From the very beginning of the introduction to modern political and social studies, the political 
culture term has had a two-sided basis: national level measuring and cross-country comparisons. In 
this regard, the potential and impact of local communities, ethnic and religious groups, immigrants, 
and diverse economic contexts have been marginalised in political culture literature and research. 
Critics believe that the lack of attention to intra-country diversities cannot be interpreted as 
homogeneity and consistency in the political culture of societies and also can not imply the lack 
of regional potential for nurturing their own political culture (Henderson, 2004; Silver & Dowley, 
2000). Despite the dominance of national-level studies, there have been perspectives emphasising 
intra-country regions and communities as the sources of producing independent political culture. 
As one of the first to focus on this level, Elazar (1966; 1994) found three different types of political 
culture among residents of the United States called moral, individual, and traditional. These 
three types of political culture are based on the immigrant origins of its inhabitants, who have 
carried with them the basic attitudes and principles of the origins into the destination regions 
and have preserved them for generations. According to him, American national political culture is 
a combination of these three distinct types of political culture from diverse geographical origins 
but distributed throughout the United States by persistent migration. Some other scholars have 
emphasised the potential of "small worlds" to shape the political culture (Elkins & Simeon, 1980; 
Henderson, 2004; Hepburn, 2010; Simeon & Elkins, 1974). In an ongoing debate, they believe that 
the sub-national units have a significant role in the formation of political culture diversity in the 
societies. These small worlds refer to sub-national state units, such as provinces and states, as well 
as demographic groups such as ethnic groups and immigrants. Therefore, two rival approaches 
emerged to explain the factors involved in the socialisation process in these small worlds. First, 
the institution-based approach attributes sub-national differences of political cultures to the long-
run influences of local political institutions; the second, the “group-based” approach insists on the 
different socio-economic contexts of the regions as the main factor which brings about diversity in 
the values and attitudes (Henderson, 2010). In this view, the heterogeneous political culture within 
nations originates from either different economic situations or ethnic and immigrant residential 
concentrations.
In recent decades, criticising national-level and cross-national comparisons of political culture, 
identity politics studies have emphasised particular values and beliefs of marginalised groups, 
including ethnic and racial groups, sexual groups, environmentalists, youth, and other interest 
groups. According to this perspective, these sub-population groups provide the possibility of 
polarisation, contention, and conflicts within the country (Wiarda, 2014, pp. 147-149). These 
groups, as Huntington (2004) puts it, can pose a serious threat to cultural cohesion and canonical 
values of societies and as a whole to what is considered as a nation; e.g., chaos and disintegration 
in Yugoslavia, former Soviet and the U.S. in 1860 are viewed as the results of these gaps.
In sum, employing available national data and conducting cross-national research, the mainstream 
of political culture has illustrated a strong linkage between socioeconomic development and the 
emergence and growth of values related to democracy. On the other hand, many scholars are not 
rejecting the influence of development forces, but criticising the national mean data and giving 
credence to the communities and regions as powerful units that can generate their own ethos 
and principles. They believe there is a great deal of diversity in sub-national divisions coming 
from either the different socio-economic contexts of regions or the unique cultural and religious 
potential of residents. Accordingly, since Iran is a developing mosaic country with a centre-
periphery economy, both factors can influence and bias its DPC as an essential condition toward 
democratisation; an issue which is examined in the next section.
Research hypotheses and questions
As previously explained, differences in the levels of development, affect the rate of emerging values 
associated with democracy across the world in a particularly effective way. On account of specific 
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policies and planning of successive regimes, disparities in the development levels of the provinces 
of Iran have continued over a long period of time, and differences have relatively been stabled. Here, 
we employ the human development index to measure of these disparities. Human development 
is attributed to a condition in which human wellbeing, the richness of human life, and enjoying 
more opportunities and choices are provided (UNDP, 1990). This approach to development goes 
beyond mere economic growth and concentrates on the capability of individuals to advance their 
goals, enhance their agency and pursue what they value (Alkire & Deneulin, 2009). Both because 
of the theoretical emphasis on the significance of human empowerment in directing values and 
because oil and other natural resources extracted in certain provinces can artificially raise their 
GDP, using the inclusive human development index better depicts the development situation of 
provinces. From this perspective, we examine whether the human development level in sub-state 
units (Iranian provinces) can cause the same effect and distinguish these units in terms of DPC.
  
Moreover, we investigate whether there are differences among ethnic groups' DPC and if they 
can affect the national political culture trend to create heterogeneity. Hence, the two research 
questions of this study are as follows:
• Does the HDI and its components in Iranian provinces influence their DPC?
• Does ethnic cultural heritage really matter? Do different Iranian ethnic groups report 
a significantly different DPC?
Methodology
Research design
As for most studies on sub-national regions, investigating relationships is statistically problematic. 
The primary purposes of most surveys related to political values conducted by international 
institutions are national-level analyses and cross-national comparisons, and so they systematically 
fail to cover and represent the sub-national units. Another problem comes from the limitation in 
the number of cases that restrict the analysis to existing instances. Furthermore, as the experience 
of Iran shows, there might be manipulation of the sub-state boundaries due to administrative, 
political, and economical purposes. Both recent regimes' policies have led to a gradual rise in the 
number of provinces which have become detached from their historical ethnic identity. Not only 
were large units (Emarats) torn into small pieces, but in some cases even the newly established 
provinces crossed the geographical boundaries of ethnic communities; a situation that makes it 
hard to designate the precise identity of each province ethnically and religiously. Finally, lack of 
interest in most governments to collect data at the ethnic community level, including development 
levels, has resulted in a serious shortage of reliable data throughout multi-ethnic societies.
Taking all of these concerns into account, to follow up on the questions raised, a dual strategy 
was adopted to investigate the differences in sub-national units: First, measuring the relationship 
between development and democratic values at the provincial level, regardless of their ethnic 
context. The provinces are the second-level administrative division in the unitary country of Iran, 
which comprise several municipalities and are managed by a governor, appointed by the executive 
power. Second, exploring ethnic groups in terms of the emerged democratic values regardless of 
provincial divisions. Therefore, at first, it is diagnosed whether provincial DPCs are responding to 
their levels of development pro-rata and, if so, how effective the development is. To examine the 
second question, and to discover the ethnic heritage capabilities to affect the trajectory, the DPC 
differences among ethnic communities are analysed.
The main independent variable in the analyses is the human development index, whose data were 
obtained from the Office for Planning and Macroeconomics Management of Presidential Deputyship 
for Planning and Strategic Monitoring.3 Although provincial differences in human development have 
been quite constant over a relatively long time, to avoid issues of exogeneity, data from two years 
3    Recently merged with the Planning and Budget Organization: http://www.mporg.ir/
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before the survey, i.e., 2005 were employed. 
To construct the democratic political culture model, data from the World Value Survey (WVS) 
Wave 5 (2005-2009) was employed. This survey was conducted in Iran with a sample size of 
2,667 respondents in 2007 and is the most recent and the only reliable dataset on the values and 
attitudes of Iranians. Fortunately, the WVS dataset contains demographic information including 
respondents' ethnic origin and their province of residence, which allows for implementing 
comparative tests. However, due to low sample sizes, six provinces including Ilam, Bushehr, 
Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Semnan, Kohgiluyeh, and Boyer-Ahmad, and Yazd were excluded from 
the analyses. Moreover, the WVS data for the Khorasan province, which recently split into three 
provinces of South, North, and Razavi Khorasan, merged into one case named Khorasan due to 
common historical roots, as well as adapting to HDI data. 
According to the Human Development theory, as people’s socio-economic conditions improve, 
some changes in cultural beliefs emerge. These changes are inclined toward democratic attitudes 
and beliefs, and as the development process moves forward, there is a shift from materialistic and 
survival values to post-materialist values and from giving priority to survival needs toward free 
choice, tolerance, gender equality, environmental concerns, and interpersonal trust (Inglehart & 
Welzel, 2005, pp. 48-71).
Although Inglehart and Welzel employ tolerance as one of the sub-indexes of DPC, it was replaced 
with the attitude toward democracy index in this study since the tolerance index, which includes 
more acceptance of homosexuality, prostitution, abortion, and divorce is not a useful discriminatory 
criterion in Islamic societies, where rejecting these items is an essential and inseparable part of 
the faith and people have to openly declare their disagreement with these attitudes. Furthermore, 
the index of attitude toward democracy is regularly used as a benchmark for measuring DPC 
(Tessler, 2002; 2008; 2012) in Middle Eastern countries. Consequently, the DPC model consists of 
four indexes: post-materialistic values, autonomy, gender equality, and democratic attitudes.4 
4    The DPC measurement model along with all details have been provided in the appendix.
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When jobs are scarce, men should have more 
right to a job than women
Gender Equality
Men make better political leaders than 
women do
University education is more important for a 
boy than for a girl








Giving priority to 
Say in government vs. order and stable 
prices. 
Say in local affairs vs. strong defense and 
fighting crime. 










Giving priority to independence vs. faith, 
obedience and authorityIndependence
0.7332.303
Having a strong leader
Attitude to 
Democracy
Having the army rule














Source: own calculations, based on WVS data, Wave 5 (2005-2009)
Note: Cronbach’s alpha was used to calculate the internal consistency coefficients of the items 
included in the DPC model and its sub-indexes as well as the HDI components. The other column 
lists the Eigenvalues associated with each factor in Exploratory Factor Analysis.
Table 2 presents the rankings and ratings of the provinces' scores for HDI, DPC, and its sub-indexes. 
Although there is a correspondence between the rankings of DPC and human development in 
several provinces, an evident gap was observed between the rankings of the first two cases in 
the DPC list. Assessing the DPC scores for outliers, it was observed that two cases, Kurdistan and 
Zanjan, are outlier cases.
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Table 2: HDI and DPC Ranks and the ethnic and religious composition of provinces
Provinces HDI HDIRank
DPC 
Rank Main Ethnicity Group
Main Religious 
Group
Tehran 0.796 1 3 Persian Shiite
Isfahan 0.765 2 10 Persian Shiite
Qazvin 0.765 3 15 Persian Shiite
Gilan 0.753 4 6 Gilak Shiite
Fars 0.747 5 12 Persian Shiite
Khuzestan 0.738 6 7 Mixed: Arabs, Persians, and Lurs Shiite
Mazandaran 0.738 7 4 Mazany-Persian Shiite
Markazy 0.734 8 8 Persian Shiite
Qom 0.733 9 16 Persian Shiite
Golestan 0.726 10 14 Mixed: Turkman-Mazani Mixed: Shiite- Sunni 
Khorasan 0.723 11 19 Persian Shiite
Kerman 0.721 12 11 Persian Shiite
Hormozgan 0.718 13 21 Hormozi- Persian-Arab Mixed: Shiite -Sunni 
East Azerbaijan 0.716 14 13 Turk Shiite
Zanjan 0.712 15 22 Turk Shiite
Hamadan 0.710 16 18 Persian- Turk Shiite
Kermanshah 0.708 17 2 Kurd Mixed: Sunni - Shiite
Ardabil 0.703 18 17 Turk Shiite
Lorestan 0.703 19 9 Lur Shiite
West 
Azerbaijan 0.699 20 5 Mixed: Kurd- Turk Mixed: Sunni - Shiite
Kurdistan 0.667 21 1 Kurd Sunni
Sistan and 
Baluchestan 0.652 22 20 Balouch Sunni
Source: own calculations, based on WVS data, Wave 5 (2005-2009) and also, Planning and Budget 
Organization: http://www.mporg.ir/  
Also, Kermanshah, which ranks second on the DPC list, is a problematic case. Due to sharing a 
similar ethnic and development background with the first province on the list, it was treated as 
an outlier case. Therefore, all three cases were temporarily excluded from the study but would 
be expounded upon in the subsequent stage. Consequently, regression analysis is based on 19 
provinces. 
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Source:  own calculations, based on WVS data, Wave 5 (2005-2009).
Note: The table shows the highest and lowest rankings of provinces in terms of DPC scores. The 
boxplot depicts the DPC mean scores distribution: The horizontal line in the middle of the box 
denotes the median; the box comprises the middle 50% of observations; upper and lower whiskers 
represent the largest and smallest observed values; the provinces of Zanjan as a lower outlier case 
(more than 1.5 times of lower quartile) and Kurdistan as an extreme upper outlier case (more than 
3 times of upper quartile).
HDI and DPC at provincial level
A linear regression model (OLS) was used to test whether the HDI and its components as 
independent variables affect the DPC as a dependent variable at the provincial level. According 
to the findings (Model 1), HDI has a positive effect on the DPC index (β = 2.970), which indicates 
a higher level of human development, correlates with a higher level of DPC, i.e., there is a 
relatively strong correlation between the two variables (r = 0.530) in which the variance in human 
development explains 28 percent of the variance in DPC. In the next step, human development 
components were checked to find out if there is a relationship between them and DPC. To avoid 
multicollinearity, only one independent variable was included in the model at a time. 
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Table 4: Regression analyses of human development and DPC
Independent 






























r 0.530 0.504 0.389 0.571
r2 0.281 0.254 0.151 0.326
Source:  own calculation.
Note: The table presents the unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors (in parentheses), 
level of significance (in italic), correlation (Pearson’s’ r), and coefficients of determination (r2).
Apart from education, the other dimensions of HDI, including income per capita and life 
expectancy were found to be significant predictors of DPC by positive correlations of (0.50) and 
(0.57), respectively. Thus, as provinces' income per capita and higher life expectancy increase, so 
does the level of democratic values and attitudes. These results provide empirical support for the 
assertion that there is a causal nexus between human development and DPC, such that provinces 
with higher levels of human development tend to also have higher levels of DPC. 
The results indicate that even at lower levels development can affect the political culture and drive 
the sub-national units toward democratic types to a certain extent. In other words, similarly to 
the nation-state level, the equilibrium between development and democratic values and attitudes 
operates at lower levels. In this way, democratic values are more likely to emerge in more developed 
sub-national units. Eventually, there seems to be a necessary relation between development and 
the emergence of democratic values, so that the essence of development strongly impacts the 
configuration of the national political culture. In addition, and more importantly, the regional 
inequality within a country can establish a heterogeneous political culture and cause cultural 
disintegration. Regardless of the official claims, as well as the slogans about national unity, 
governments' regional development policies appear to have a greater impact on the homogeneity 
and/or heterogeneity of the nation’s political culture.
As mentioned, there has been an economic gap among various provinces created through regional 
biased development planning and policies, and while some regions have substantially benefited, 
others have been excluded or left out of the opportunities and privileges. The further this process 
goes, the deeper the gap becomes. As the results show, this economic gap has led to a disparity in 
the regions' political culture, and the deeper the objective inequality, the greater the subjective gap. 
In this way, as the experience of Iran indicates, inequality not only divides a country economically 
but also culturally. It is not surprising that Tehran as the most developed city of Iran and a few 
other economically advanced cities are the centres of pro-democracy demonstrations and protest 
rallies against the regime. In contrast, there are some other deprived areas and poor communities 
whose members are struggling to meet basic survival needs such as food, housing, drinking water, 
etc. They are either almost silent or their protesting voices and reactions are not the ones that 
make the world satisfied. 
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Ethnic or national political culture
As mentioned, theoretically, ethnic and religious diversity can be a potential source of difference 
in political culture. There can be small worlds that nurture their own values and attitudes and 
resist national trends. Therefore, the WVS dataset was analysed based on ethnicity, and five main 
Iranian ethnic groups were compared in terms of all DPC indices to find probable differences 
between them. This issue is also doubly important because there were three outlier provinces in 
the previous stage that may have originated from ethnic backgrounds.
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of ethnicity on the DPC. The analysis of 
variance shows that the effect of ethnicity on the DPC is significant, F(4, 2530) = 18.27, p=.000). 
Subsequent Post-hoc comparisons using the Scheffe HSD test revealed that the Kurds (M =.552, 
SD = 1.167) had a significantly higher average score on the measure of DPC than all other ethnic 
groups, and except for a significant difference between Persians and Turks, the other pairwise 
comparisons between five main ethnic groups show no significant differences. Likewise, there 
are two identified subsets of ethnic groups with categories of Kurds in a subset of its own and 
other ones in another subset, in which their mean scores of DPC are not different from each 
other (p=.207<ɑ=.05). Overall, these results show a gap between the Kurds and other Iranian 
ethnic groups in terms of DPC and also a significantly higher difference of Persians compared to 
Turks. This recent difference may justify the situation of Zanjan as an outlier; since the Turkish 
community, which Zanjan belongs to, obtains the lowest DPC score. As the Kurdish area of Iran 
is almost the most underdeveloped region of the country, it was theoretically expected to rank 
lowest in the DPC index but stood at the top. The Kurdish area stretches across four provinces 
including Kurdistan, Kermanshah, West Azarbaijan, and Ilam, in which all four provinces share the 
common trend in the DPC scores; such that the two first with high scores of DPC were excluded as 
outliers in OLS regression, while the third one was expected to rank low due to its low HDI score 
but ranked fifth in the DPC index.
Table 5: Means, Standard Deviations, and Standard errors of DPC scores in main Iranian ethnic 
groups 
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Persian 1526 -.006 .993 .025 -.056 .043
Lur 138 -.040 .960 .081 -.202 .121
Gilak 120 .064 .911 .083 -.100 .229
Kurd 185 .552 1.167 .086 .383 .721
Turk 566 -.168 .920 .039 -.244 -.0915
Source:  own calculation, based on WVS data, Wave 5 (2005-2009)
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Table 6: Ethnicity effect on DPC and test for homogeneity of ethnic groups
Homogeneous subsets 












Source: own calculation, based on WVS data, Wave 5 (2005-2009)
Note: Post-hoc comparisons between ethnic groups using Scheffe. * The mean difference is 
significant at the 0.05 level. Homogeneous subsets of groups are displayed.
As the northerly part of the Kurdish region is a Sunni-populated area, the data were explored to 
determine the impact of denominational affiliations in DPC's scores, both among the Kurds and 
among the entire population without the Kurds. In this regard, paired T-tests were applied to compare 
all DPC sub-index scores in possible differentiation points. Such comparisons allow inconsistencies in 
sub-indexes to be detected. At the initial stage, comparing Kurds with other Iranians yielded significant 
differences between them in all DPC sub-indexes. The differences became even more profound when 
Sunni Kurds separately were compared with other Iranians that are predominantly Shiite. 






Gender equality Attitudes to democracy
Kurds 2.27 0.08 0.26 0.24











Sunni Kurds 2.45 0.16 0.37 0.23











Iranian Shiites 1.81 -0.10 -0.012 -0.02
Iranian Sunnis 











Source: own calculation, based on WVS data, Wave 5 (2005-2009).
Note: The table presents the mean, mean differences and significance level (in parentheses) for 
each group.
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Although at first the results suggested an effect of denominational affiliation on DPC scores, the 
comparison between Shiites and Sunnis led to the opposite result. In other words, when analysis 
takes into account denominational affiliations among Iranians without Kurds, Shiites obtain 
higher means in two sub-indexes of DPC and significantly higher means in two others. Simply 
put, these findings indicate that denominational affiliation cannot explain why the Kurdish ethnic 
group does not correspond to the Iranian political culture trend. Although there is a lack of studies 
investigating the characteristics of Iranian ethnic groups' political culture, using domestic data 
(Abdollahi & Hosseinbor, 2007), the distinct trajectory of Kurds has already been demonstrated. 
It is likely that either the struggles and campaigns against successive authoritarian regimes of 
Iran have affected their attitudes and values or it is possible that the mystical and Sufi nature of 
the religion in the Kurdish area  (Van Bruinessen, 1992, pp. 203-267) has influenced their political 
culture.
Accordingly, these results suggest that one "small world" with the capability of generating unique 
attitudes can be discerned in the multi-ethnic society of Iran. Except for this gap, there were no 
considerable differences between ethnic groups and no meaningful differences between Shiites 
and Sunnis as the main denominations of Iran in terms of DPC. 
Conclusion
Theoretically, two critical factors are threatening the homogeneity of the national political culture 
structure and act as key determinants of its deformation in multi-ethnic societies: biased regional 
development forces of modernisation that may disturb the balance among various regions and 
ethno-religious heritage of small worlds. As the results of this research indicate, the concentration 
of power and wealth in certain areas and exclusion of others can create inconsistencies in new 
emerging values and make the regions more scattered in terms of political culture. Hence, disparity 
in regional development influences the democratic attitudes and values people practice, even in 
sub-national units. That is, the more developed the region, the more prevalent DPC, and the deeper 
the inequality, the more profound the political culture gap among the regions. This evidence 
suggests that establishing systematic economic discrimination across the Iranian nation-state has 
brought about heterogeneity in the cultural foundations and created disparity within society's 
political culture structure. The second factor, ethno-religious heritage, was a little complicated. As 
far as the results of this study are concerned, except for the Kurds’ community, other ethnic groups 
in Iran show no broad differences in democratic values. Hence, although these small worlds are 
sources of cultural diversity, they are not necessarily generating their own political values and 
attitudes or capable of biasing the impact of modernisation forces. Since this empirical research 
was limited to democratic political culture and our measure examines only democratic values, it 
is unplausible to go further and appraise possible variations in other political culture components 
among these communities. Yet, further studies can properly monitor other gaps, for instance, low 
institutional confidence, which is a source of potential instability (Ruck et al., 2020). 
Although Iran suffers from both sources of disparity in its political culture, results suggest the 
effects of these factors on political culture heterogeneity are not equal, because just one community 
(Kurds) was found as unique. However, the impact of long-lasting biased modernisation has 
profoundly affected this country's political culture. Therefore, the most significant factor that 
threatens the cultural homogeneity of a developing country like Iran does not lie in its diversity, 
but in the centre-periphery economic structure. Thus, as long as this uneven development 
condition maintains, neither the political revolution nor the reformist movements could succeed 
in democratising the country. As the first study exploring variation in Iranian political culture from 
a different perspective, we uncovered some aspects and potential obstacles to the democratisation 
process which other approaches including structuralist, elitist, and even mainstream approaches 
of political culture have neglected or underestimated. Most of these approaches analyse Tehran 
rather than Iran and generalise the developments of the centre to the wholeness of the country. 
These results are also consonant with political events. Almost all pro-democracy movements and 
collective actions have been initiated and organised in Tehran and a few other developed cities 
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and have not spread out to other regions. Conversely, livelihood movements such as the so-called 
“Aban Protests” (2017) or “Gas Protests” (2019) spread all over the country, while pro-democracy 
forces mostly concentrated in Tehran remained silent and couldn't take a stand. 
These results can also be helpful in the study of other transition countries with similar 
backgrounds. For instance, it may explain why the Arab Spring in some fragile societies of the 
Middle East failed, where peaceful street demonstrations began against authoritarian regimes in a 
few major developed cities and then escalated into bloody civil wars, as the protests spread across 
the countries. In fact, diverse methods of protesting and dealing with social conflicts emerge from 
varied political values and the even, preferred regime type people demand would be influenced 
by their values (Welzel, 2014). Notably, a synergistic effect of both factors of inequality and small 
worlds may provoke hatred among the ethnic communities, demolish the peaceful coexistence 
and inter-community bonds. That is, if inequalities arising from biased economic policies stand 
on ethnic borders, it may lead to fragmentation, polarisation, and a possible collapse of the 
foundations of society in critical moments of the nation's history.
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Appendix
The Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) model of DPC constructed using WVS data and AMOS 
software. All variables were entered into the model after standardisation (Z standard scores) in 
SPSS. From the four indexes of DPC, the Post-Materialistic and the Independence have been treated 
as observed variables, since they have been calculated in the WVS dataset. Two remaining indexes 
of Gender Equality and Attitude toward Democracy are considered as latent variables. 
Figure A1: Measurement model of democratic political culture (DPC) and its factor loadings
Source: own elaboration, based on WVS data, Wave 5 (2005-2009).






Table A2: Model fit indices for the DPC
Model CFI TLI PNFI PCFI RMSEA GFI AGFI
0.965 0.946 0.522 0.622 0.087 0.755 0.535
Source: own elaboration.
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Y001        <--- POLITICAL_CULTURE 0.9351.0
Y003        <--- POLITICAL_CULTURE  0.04.9900.1590.8170.795
Gender_ Equality <--- POLITICAL_
CULTURE 0.04.2690.1260.8360.540
ZV44 <--- Gender_ Equality  0.7671.0
ZV61<--- Gender_ Equality  0.04.6280.2740.7861.268
ZV62<--- Gender_ Equality  0.03.9220.1830.6980.718
ZV63<--- Gender_ Equality  0.06.8470.1760.9671.205
Democracy <--- POLITICAL_
CULTURE 0.03.4240.1360.6500.466
ZV148 <--- Democracy  0.9721.0
ZV150<--- Democracy  0.0711.3680.2590.2630.354
ZV151R <---   Democracy  0.0741.7870.2160.4470.387
ZV162 <--- Democracy  0.0551.4200.2200.3300.312
Source: own elaboration.
